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The Social Contract:  
Re-framing Scottish Nationalism1 
 
 





I mean, my father saw everything he had worked to build, 
crumble, and he put it all down to Mrs. Thatcher.   But in 
his time, he saw everything fall apart, and I think that is 
an absolute tragedy.  And he’s only typical of all that 
generation.  They came out of the thirties, they came out of 
poverty, they fought against all the odds, they were 
wonderful people in the sense of humanity they brought to 
their lives, with courage and humor, and dedication to a 
future that they knew would be much better.  And they 
created that, and it certainly was better, and we took it 
all for granted.  My generation thought it would be like a 
snowball, constantly rolling down the hill, and that it 
would just get fatter and bigger, and go on to be more 
wonderful... and we blew it... 
 
These words were spoken to me by a member of the SNP in an 
interview during the early days of my ethnographic fieldwork on 
the nationalist movement in Scotland, conducted in 1993-94.  At 
that point in the conversation we were talking about the 
differences between socialism and capitalism, and what kind of 
                     
1
 This article stems from fieldwork that was funded by the 
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.  My thanks 
to Neil MacCormick for his comments on an earlier draft. 
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society she would prefer to live in.  Her words convey a 
perspective on the Scottish situation that I became quite 
familiar with during my research, one I came to consider central 
to understanding nationalist politics in Scotland.  She speaks of 
a hope for a better world that has been betrayed, of a trust 
broken.  The underlying image is one of a great social project 
that was meant to be passed on from generation to generation, but 
has been abandoned.  And while the speaker takes some of the 
blame on herself and her generation (“...we blew it...”), it is 
clear that this broken trust is connected to the rightward 
political shift of the 1970s and after.  
  
Efforts to make sense of Scottish nationalism have tended to 
emphasize the complex interaction of two aspects: the role of 
uneven economic development between Scotland and England (Nairn 
1981; Hechter 1977; Dickson 1980); and the unique and well 
developed institutional infrastructure of Scottish civil society.  
I am inclined to agree with McCrone (1992:55-87) that economic 
contrasts between Scotland and England have been over-drawn, 
losing sight of the fundamental parallels in economic trends 
throughout the UK (and the industrialized world for that matter).  
However, I also agree that the deeply entrenched nature of 
Scottish civil society, particularly in its historical 
articulation with the development of the welfare state as 
analyzed by Paterson (1997), is a key factor in the current 
strength of autonomist politics in Scotland.  In fact, as an 
anthropologist, my primary interest is in social conflicts over 
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distributive justice, and how culture and political discourse 
shape people’s conceptions of the state and its proper role in 
social life.  It was this basic concern that led me to study 
Scottish nationalism (or autonomism, the term I use to designate 
the more general pull toward home rule, whether in the form of a 
parliament or independence), rather than an interest in 
nationalism per se.   
  
When doing social analysis it is sometimes useful to set aside 
the usual frameworks through which a subject has been approached, 
so that a changed perspective might at least refresh our 
thinking.  This essay attempts to explore the meaning of the 
themes and imagery in the quote above by re-framing our 
understanding of the nationalist movement within the idea of the 
social contract.  Politics in Scotland, as elsewhere, is 
undoubtedly strongly conditioned by the conflicting forces and 
interests encoded in economic processes and institutional 
structures.  But politics is also waged, and political goals 
formulated and pursued, through ideas--ideas which are never 
newly minted for the purpose, but rather are inherited and 
adapted to present circumstances.   The people of Scotland (and 
the “West” more generally) are the heritors of historically and 
culturally embedded ideas about politics and how it works, and 
central among these is the idea of the social contract.  I will 
argue that the social contract is not so much a political theory 
as a key cultural metaphor, so basic that it is often only 
implicit in our thinking, that profoundly shapes understandings 
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of the Scottish situation, and thus in turn the social movement 
for greater political autonomy.  
  
As a social anthropologist my job is to explore the cultural 
groundings of social behavior.  As a creature of the same 
“western” tradition of political thought, trying to understand 
the nationalist movement in Scotland has helped me to view my own 
heritage as a partial stranger.  I hope to repay the favor.  
 
II. THE IDEA OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
  
The notion of a social contract between ruler and ruled reaches 
back into medieval history, as far back as the 11th century and 
the Alsatian monk Manegold of Lautenbach’s defense of the 
authority Pope Gregory VII against that of the Emperor Henry IV 
(Lessnoff 1990:5-6).  In Scotland George Buchannan (1506-1582),  
contributed to this line of thinking by arguing for the election 
of monarchs by the nobility, and the legitimacy of regicide in 
the case of tyrannical kings.  Nonetheless, as James VI’s tutor, 
his ideas operated within the established genre of political 
advice to princes, as instructions toward good kingship, rather 
than as a fundamental challenge to the system of feudal monarchy.   
The concept took a new form, the one we most closely associate it 
with today, in the 17th and 18th century writings of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau, who sought to provide new bases and 
justifications for the authority of the sovereign and the power 
of the state.  The upheavals of that period saw a weakening of 
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political legitimations based on notions of tradition and divine 
right.  The arguments of the classic social contract theorists 
deployed a more naturalistic (even materialistic) understanding 
of human wills and motives, and the problems of aggregating them 
into the collective will of the polity.  The details of the 
various and divergent conceptions of the social contract in this 
period need not detain us here.  The crucial point is that this 
new emphasis on the consent of the governed helped lay the 
groundwork for modern conceptions of democratic politics. 
  
In the 19th and 20th centuries social contract theories went out 
of fashion, displaced by a mixture of pragmatism, utopianism, 
realpolitik.  But since the 1970s the model has been revived in 
political philosophy, once again in a new form, largely spurred 
by John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971; for introductions to 
this literature, see Lessnoff 1990 and Sandel 1984).  These new 
formulations of the social contract are notable for their shift 
away from the basic legitimation of political authority and the 
state and toward arguments about distributive justice within the 
modern state, the existence of which, whether maximal or minimal, 
is now taken for granted.  Most of this recent work tries to 
assume/imagine what kind of political economic regime rational 
agents would agree to in a context free of coercion.  In other 
words, they begin from basic liberal assumptions about the 
autonomous rational will of the individual, though not 
surprisingly, just as liberalism is highly varied along a left-
right political spectrum, so are these new formulations.  Rawls’s 
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work is very much a justification of the liberal welfare state, 
which takes an active role in guaranteeing equality of 
opportunity and basic well being of its citizens.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum in a neo-Lockean mode, Robert Nozick 
(1974) defends the idea of a minimal state that primarily aims to 
preserve property rights, understood as somehow natural or pre-
social.  Still others have emphasized the idea of the social 
contract not simply as a way of protecting individual rights and 
autonomy, but as a necessary context for the formulation of 
shared conceptions of the common good.  Thus, in a somewhat 
impressionistic manner, Michael Walzer has suggested that: 
 
The social contract is an agreement to reach decisions 
together about what goods are necessary to our common life, 
and then to provide those goods for one another.  The 
signers owe one another more than mutual aid, for that they 
owe or can owe anyone.  They owe mutual provision for all 
those things for the sake of which they have separated 
themselves from mankind as a whole and joined forces in a 
particular community  (1983:65). 
 
Walzer’s characterization of the social contract highlights the 
centrality of matters of distributive justice within the 
political community for contemporary discussions.  But as one 
reviews these various notions of the social contract it becomes 
clear that this is far from one, clearly formulated idea--it is 
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more a style of argument.  Jean Hampton, an authority on Hobbes 
and social contract theory, has argued, I think rightly, that 
 
...even though theorists who call themselves 
‘contractarians’ have all supposedly begun from the same 
reflective starting point, namely, what rational people 
could ‘agree to’, the many differences and disagreements 
among them show that although they are supposedly in the 
same philosophical camp, in fact they are united not by a 
common philosophical theory but by a common image.   
Philosophers hate to admit it, but sometimes they work from 
pictures rather than ideas (1995:379, italics in original).  
 
Hampton’s insight here is more than an accusation of theoretical 
muddle-headedness.  The social contract is an “image” or a 
“picture,” because it arises out of a culturally embedded 
tradition of political thought, rather than being systematically 
designed, de novo, by philosophers.  It is what I would prefer to 
call an analogy or a key metaphor (cf. Fernandez 1974; Guthrie 
1995; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Anthropologists, long concerned 
with the role of symbols in the creation and recreation of 
culture, are quite used to the fuzziness and slippery-ness 
implied by metaphor, seeing it not as failed philosophy, but 
rather a part of how belief systems actually work.  An important 
aspect of this process is that symbols, including metaphors, are 
multivocalic, condensing disparate points of reference into a 
single image (Turner 1970:29-30).  In this way such metaphors are 
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double-edged, able to both concentrate, integrate, and focus an 
array of discrete problems and concerns, and at the same time 
eliding and obscuring important divergences between the various 
dimensions of social life that have been brought together in the 
symbolic process.  In the rest of this paper I will try to lay 
out how the metaphor of the social contract does this in the case 
of Scottish nationalism. 
 
III. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN SCOTLAND  
 
Let me outline the historical embededness of this metaphor of the 
social contract in Scotland, before discussing the current 
sociopolitical problems and relationships in Scotland that get 
bundled together through this image.    
  
The dominant image of the Covenant in Scottish political history 
springs first to mind.  The National Covenant (1638) and the 
Solemn League and Covenant (1643) were historically pivotal, 
establishing a political device and rhetorical trope that would 
be drawn upon right up to the present century (cf. Brotherstone 
1989). From the reaffirmations of the Covenants during the Kirk 
secessions of the 18th century, to the enduring lore of the 
Covenanters that runs from the latter 17th century up to the Red 
Clydesiders, to John MacCormick’s Scottish Covenant of the 1940s 
and 50s, the Covenant theme is strikingly constant.  The contexts 
of these Covenants is highly varied, and more recent ones are 
bound to earlier ones by rhetorical device, perhaps more than by 
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common circumstances.  Nonetheless, from Greyfriar’s Kirkyard to 
John MacCormick, there are at least some basic continuities that 
suggest a minimal definition of what is meant sociologically (as 
opposed to theologically) by a Covenant in all these cases.  To 
wit, Covenants create or reaffirm social bonds of membership in a 
community, especially when that community is somehow threatened.  
Moreover, Covenants look in two directions at once--inward toward 
the community whose solidarity is being reinforced, and outward 
toward recalcitrant parties that the Covenanters seek to bind 
into new terms of agreement.  The original National Covenant was 
meant to be signed not only by the faithful of the “true 
religion” in “ilk shire, balzierie, stewartry, or distinct 
judicatorie” in Scotland, but most importantly, by Charles I 
himself. 
  
I would further argue the Covenant should be viewed as the 
leading member of a broader family of political tropes which 
should also include the Claims of Right of 1688, 1842, and 1988, 
the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), and the Democracy Declaration 
presented at Summit of the European Parliament in Edinburgh in 
December of 1992.  While the image of contract in these cases is 
not as explicit as in the Covenants, the underlying premises of 
these political actions assume a kind of contractual situation in 
which terms of agreement are threatened or have gone awry.  The 
purpose is to make appeals to the justice of higher authorities, 
whether the medieval Pope, Westminster, the European Parliament, 
or the democratic sensibilities of the general public.  The 
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specific circumstances of these events vary considerably.  The 
Declaration of Arbroath asks Pope John XXII to bring his limited 
political authority to bear on a situation of war between 
separate, sovereign countries, both under the general umbrella of 
Christendom; the Claim of Right of 1688 was more a matter 
ofestablishing the initial terms of agreement under which the 
Scottish estates would accept being subjects of William and Mary; 
the Claim of Right of 1842 sought (and failed) to re-negotiate 
relationships of authority between the General Assembly and the 
UK Parliament; and the Claim of Right of 1988 and the Democracy 
Declaration directed their messages to a more diffuse modern 
public, at the Scottish, British and European levels, in the 
latter case again targeting a somewhat nominal outside higher 
authority, this time in the guise of a European Parliament rather 
than a Pope. 
  
We can acknowledge Hume’s classic objection to the social 
contract idea--that no such contract was ever actually made (Hume 
1985[1777]:465-487)--while countering that such political actions 
of course do not simply follow from contracted agreements, but 
rather, often seek to create agreements by proceeding in an “as 
if” fashion.  Assuming what one needs to prove is not simply an 
old trick of academic argument, it is also a time honored 
strategy of political rhetoric.  The absence of an explicit 
social contract does not alter the fact that political action 
frequently proceeds as though an implicit trust has been broken.  
In real social life, a diffuse and undefined trust is often built 
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up first, with explicit terms of agreement (constitutions and 
contracts) coming later (cf. Baier 1986).  What matters for the 
present argument is not whether the social contract was ever 
formally instituted--it was not, and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 
were all well aware of this.  Nor does it matter whether the 
metaphor of a contract is the best we can create as a way of 
modeling ideal political relations--it is obviously ambiguous and 
problematic.  What matters is, we actually do think and talk as 
if our social and political relations are contractual, and to an 
important degree, that makes it so. 
  
Having stressed that the social contract is a metaphor, an 
ambiguous image, I would argue that theories of nationalism, as 
with all notions of social causation, also have a powerful if 
often only implicit metaphorical dimension.  The differences in 
these metaphors guide our thinking along different lines.  When 
we employ a social contract metaphor in our political analyses it 
directs our attention to processes of negotiation and 
legitimation.  This metaphor tends to err in the direction of 
over-emphasizing the role of conscious and deliberate human 
agency in the political process.  By the same token, if we 
believe that there is an important role for human agency in the 
social process in question, it will help guide our attention 
toward that dimension of our subject matter.  By contrast, 
theories of nationalism tend to draw on a series of physicalistic 
metaphors so familiar (especially in political theory since 
Hobbes) that we often hardly notice them (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 
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1980).  Eric Wolf (1982:6-7) has characterized this as the 
“billiard ball” approach to social analysis, in which social 
groups and forces are treated in an atomistic fashion.  The cue 
ball of primordial ethnicity, or relative deprivation, or uneven 
development, strikes the population in question, sending its 
nationalist sentiments rolling.  (Note that who holds the cue 
itself is unanswerable within this metaphorical field.)  This 
metaphor requires the assumption of a certain passivity on the 
part of the social subjects under study.  If billiard balls were 
self-animating, analysing the physics of billiards would be a 
much more difficult, if not impossible task.  I am suggesting 
that we are unavoidably caught up in metaphorical thought, and 
that some entertainment of the social contract metaphor can serve 
as a corrective to the physicalistic metaphors that tend to 
inform theories of nationalism, and politics more generally.  But 
there is also a deeper issue at stake, involving our basic 
understanding of the role of ideas and agency in human social 
life.  If politics is something that people do (no matter how 
limited their understanding of the circumstances in which they 
act) rather than something that simply happens to them, then the 
social contract metaphor may have certain fundamental advantages 
for a social analysis that seeks to be actively engaged in the 
process it analyzes.    
  
The metaphor of the social contract in modern Scottish politics 
not only has a rich, concrete history, only sketchily alluded to 
above, but it also has an array of current reference points, a 
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set of variations on a theme.  Of key importance are these three 
relationships: labor to capital; citizen to state; and Scotland 
to England.  These dimensions are concretely historically 
interrelated, and the image of the contract tends to assimilate 
these tensions to one another in the political imagination. 
  
It has become a commonplace to refer to the historical compromise 
between capital and labor framed in terms of the ideas of Keynes 
as a kind of “social contract.”  Wisdom is not always abstruse, 
and sometimes the commonplace contains much insight.  While the 
globalization of capital is hardly as recent a process as is 
often suggested these days, it is readily apparent that changes 
in technology and capital mobility have weakened the bargaining 
position of organized labor since the 1960s.  The capital-labor 
contract was a complex product of competition and bargaining by 
both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means--of a particular 
concatenation of strikes and votes delivered and withheld.  In 
turn, this contract was always superimposed upon a more classic 
conception of the social contract as one between citizens and the 
state.  T. H. Marshall’s (1950) conception of the progressive 
attainment of rights--civil, political, and social--through the 
state, expresses this idea in abstract form.  Ideas such as 
“Homes fit for Heroes” after World War One in the UK, and the G. 
I. Bill in the US after World War Two, express the role of the 
social contract metaphor as a rationale in the legitimation of 
the state.  The citizen serves his country, upholding his end of 
the bargain, and the state owes him a certain standard of living 
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in return.  (It seems appropriate to preserve the sex bias in the 
language here both because of the specific subject, and because 
it reminds us that by and large the benefits of the welfare state 
have gone to (white, middle class) men.)  Correspondingly, the 
critique of the welfare state from the right has emphasized the 
problem of ungovernability stemming from the constant expansion 
of rights and demands on resources from particular constituencies 
of the citizenry.  In this view, the contract has gotten out of 
hand. 
 
Across the globe the industrialized democracies of the “West” 
have seen a general breakdown of this double contract between 
capital and labor, and the state and its citizens.  And this 
breakdown is widely perceived as a result of intractable, natural 
processes of the world economy and market system, rather than the 
active decisions of capital interests with strategic advantages 
seeking to better their competitive positions.  Thus we find 
ourselves in the situation that Habermas (1989) has labeled “the 
new obscurity,” in which the utopian vision of better world based 
on the mastery of the productive process has waned, to be 
replaced by a diffuse array of situated struggles, both 
progressive and reactionary. 
  
But this breakdown is experienced in different ways in different 
places.  In the US, due in part to the strength of anticommunism, 
there is a relatively weak sense in the popular imagination of 
the larger social contract as a product of strategic bargaining 
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by labor, progressively entrenched in legislation.  Instead post-
war affluence is commonly understood as the natural outcome of 
superior morality and industriousness--with recent economic 
stagnation for the middle/working class frequently attributed to 
a decline in these same factors.  Moreover, in common parlance in 
the US, the meaning of the word “welfare” is restricted to 
poverty relief, the idea that the other limited entitlements in 
the US, e.g., social security and Medicare, are forms of welfare, 
would strike many in the US as strange.  In short, US culture is 
relatively inarticulate when it comes the larger twofold contract 
between labor and capital, and citizens and the state, lacking 
the conceptual/metaphorical tools in popular discourse that could 
render the issues more concrete.  
  
But, as Dickson (1989) has demurred, Scotland is “different.”  
According to my analysis, an important part of what makes 
Scotland different is that the “larger” social contract of the 
post-war period is encoded through and made more tangible by a 
third dimension--the contracted unity of Scotland and England in 
the United Kingdom, and the grounding of this contract in an 
historical tradition of political conflict.  In Scotland, 
objection to the breakdown of the larger social contract tends to 
get expressed in terms of autonomist politics.  The opposition 
between capital and labor, between citizens and the state, gets 
metaphorically mapped onto the opposition between Scotland and 
England.   
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This happens for a variety of reasons deeply implicated in what 
British political scientists have called the North-South divide 
in the UK.  If we regard this divide as simply a question of the 
divergence of voting behavior, then perhaps it has become passé 
since the last general election.  However, there is an important 
geography of power that lies deeper than voting behavior.  The 
actual center of political power is in England, more specifically 
southern England, Westminster, and “the City.”  Both the major 
political institutions and the decisive weight of the popular 
vote are located there.  Obviously the centralization of power in 
the British constitution accentuates this.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that the recent weakening of the larger contract is a 
result of the growing importance of finance capital in relation 
to industrial capital, London is again a tangible center of this 
process.  The crucial point is that Scotland’s history since at 
least 1609 has been one of complex negotiations, involving both 
resistance and assimilation, with London/England as the center of 
political and economic power.  As Paterson has shown (1994), 
current autonomist politics in Scotland is made possible by the 
fact that Scotland, through its institutions of civil society, 
has retained a significant degree of bargaining power in the 
contracted relations between Scotland and England.  Moreover, in 
this century the elites controlling key Scottish institutions 
have primarily bargained for a better contract within the context 
of the welfare state--i.e., the “larger contract.”  Though for 
much of the last three hundred years a notion of Scottish 
assimilation to England has been a dominant theme in British 
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historiography (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989; Fry 1992; Kidd 
1993), the underlying reality has not been so simple.  The 
Scotland-England contract is encoded in the long history of 
Covenants, Claims of Right, and declarations, not to mention the 
Treaty of Union itself, that figure so prominently in the 
rhetoric of 20th century autonomist politics.  The trust broken 
between capital and labor, between the welfare state and its 
citizens, is experienced and articulated as a breakdown in the 
contract between Scotland and England.  In keeping with this, the 
central values that have underwritten the larger contract--
egalitarianism, democracy, socialism or at least a certain 
version of distributive justice--have tended to become 
reappropriated as distinctively Scottish values.  These are 
precisely the values that are seen as having been betrayed by 
capital/the state/England. 
 
So as not to be misunderstood, let me stress that I am not 
arguing that autonomist politics in Scotland are a result of 
mystification or “false consciousness” in the form of 
metaphorical thought.  I am arguing that metaphorical predication 
is an unavoidable aspect of social discourse, especially the 
political, and that therefore it should be engaged as consciously 
and wisely as possible.  I am suggesting that the metaphor of the 
social contract provides a deep structure to Scottish politics 
that can be both helpful and a hindrance.  On the one hand, it is 
important not to let the momentum of political rhetoric collapse 
the important distinctions on the other side of the contractual 
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equation.  The histories of capitalism, the modern state, and 
England are closely related, but they are not the same thing.  On 
the other hand, if the contractual metaphor lends a certain 
concreteness to struggles over the larger contract, reducing 
Habermas’s “new obscurity,” then so be it.  Moreover, as I 
suggested above, to the extent that people engage in politics as 
though it were a process of contractual negotiation, that makes 
it so.  Though huge portions of social life exist as conditions 
and constraints that are prior to any contractual political 
process, that does not logically negate the reality and 
importance of processes of negotiation.   
 
The distinction made above between the social contract metaphor 
and the more physicalistic metaphors that tend to inform theories 
of nationalism is crucial, because there are no contracts in 
nature--they are wholly a human creation.2  Thus rather than 
trying to understand human social action through an analogy to 
natural processes of physical force and cause and effect, the 
notion of the social contract takes a model from one area of 
social life--people do make agreements, reach shared 
understandings of common obligation--and magnifies it to make 
sense of politics on the largest scale.  My point here has 
something in common with Vico’s argument that we can understand 
history as the maker understands the object made, because it is 
                     
2
 I would note here that despite his skepticism regarding the 
idea of the social contract, this point is very much in keeping 
with Hume’s idea of justice as a “social artifice,” i.e., as a 
set of conventions inherited through long custom, but without 
transcendent justification. 
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our own creation.  While undoubtedly a metaphor, with all the 
slippery-ness that that entails, the social contract construes 
history as at least partly our own creation, rather than as 
something done to us by forces beyond our control.  Finally, to 
Vico I would add a touch of Hegel.  Politics is not simply a 
hydraulic transfer of social pressures, that changes objective 
interests into pragmatic action.  It is a quest for recognition, 
from the empowered by the disempowered, which gets historically 
inscribed in particular ways.  In Scotland, the quests for 
recognition as workers, as citizens, and as Scots, interact in 
complex ways that are bound up with the development of the modern 
state, and that cannot be neatly pulled apart, because once done, 
history comprises a singular whole.  The ramifying social 
contract metaphor is a way of grappling with this complex 
interaction through the collective political imagination. 
   
IV. SOME REFLEXIVE CONCLUSIONS 
  
Anthropologists are notorious for hunting out the “other,”  
usually understood in terms of linguistic and cultural 
“difference.”  While there are important differences between 
Scottish and American culture (bearing in mind the internal 
diversity of both of these), there are also deep continuities 
between the two.  Through such figures as James Madison, Scottish 
Enlightenment thought played a profound role in the creation of 
the United States.  Despite these connections, I have had to 
engage an “other” in my research in Scotland.  But the most 
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problematic “other” that I have had to confront in Scottish 
ethnography is “nationalism” itself.  My upbringing instilled in 
me a classic liberal/left skepticism about nationalism--it is a 
strange idea, difficult for me to imagine as a progressive 
historical force.  And yet researching nationalism in Scotland 
has changed my understanding of this “other.”  I am sympathetic 
to the social democratic ethos that surrounds autonomist politics 
in Scotland, and to the concrete progressive proposals, such as 
those around balanced gender representation, that inform plans 
for a prospective parliament.  I regard democracy and socialism 
as core ideals, both interdependent and problematic, that must be 
constantly built up and reinforced under particular historical 
circumstances--they cannot be perfected in abstraction first and 
then executed.  To the extent that Scottish autonomism works 
toward these ideals, towards making these abstractions concrete, 
I am supportive of it.  At the same time, to survive, ideals must 
be tempered by realism.  No matter how egalitarian the general 
social ethos may be in Scotland, no matter how progressive in 
design a potential parliament is, the larger political economic 
context of the world today is profoundly inhospitable for a 
recuperation of the state’s role in redistributive justice.        
  
I would conclude by re-emphasizing the double nature of 
metaphorical predication.  The sense of broken trust that fuels 
autonomist politics in Scotland is strengthened by the 
correlations between the various permutations of the modern 
social contract outlined above.  They reinforce one another and 
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help in the Scottish case to transform the diffuse confusion and 
sense of helplessness created by the modern political economy, 
the “new world order,” into a concrete political agenda with 
definable (if limited) goals.  But by that same token, there is a 
danger of forgetting that the metaphor is a metaphor, that the 
problems unified through metaphorical predication are in reality 
discrete processes.  No matter what adjustments are made in the 
constitutional relations between Scotland and England, conflicts 
between citizens over the role of the state in distributive 
justice are an inherent aspect of modern life, and modern states, 
especially small ones, have limited control over the global 
“contract” between capital and labor.  We should hope that 
contending with particular social contracts close to home, 
particularly the constitutional contract, will help Scots to 
imagine how to engage in new and larger struggles over the social 
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